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BOOK REVIEW
DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT
FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS. By Nadine Strossen. New York:
Scribner, 1995. pp.320. $22.00.
Reviewed by Melvin I. Urofsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more interesting, and at times more strident,
debates in recent years is between a faction of the feminist
coalition, proposing new and harsher methods of eliminating
pornography and of punishing those who produce and purvey it,
and civil libertarians, including many other feminists, who
oppose such measures primarily on First Amendment grounds.
The debate extends well beyond the cloistered halls of academe,
and is far from arcane or hypothetical.
The attack on pornography and its purveyors has been spear-
headed by writer Andrea Dworkin and law professor Catharine
MacKinnon. While the effort has won limited legislative or ju-
dicial approval, it has had striking effects elsewhere, especially
at colleges and universities, which many people consider not
only bizarre but dangerous as well.
To counter the Dworkin-MacKinnon arguments, civil libertari-
ans offer traditional First Amendment arguments. This ap-
proach, however, has been problematic, at least in constitu-
* Professor of Constitutional History, Virginia Commonwealth University; Ad-
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tional terms. The Supreme Court, through various decisions on
obscenity, has placed obscene materials' in a category that
deserves little First Amendment protection.2 Pornography also
fails to fall into any of the categories of public discourse that
Alexander Meiklejohn and other theorists have argued need to
be protected and nurtured.3
Nadine Strossen offers the latest entry into the debate.4 As
president of the American Civil Liberties Union, Strossen
unsurprisingly adopts the organization's traditional position of
unswerving commitment to full First Amendment protection of
all speech. The work, however, is aimed at a popular audience.
It is not a legal treatise,5 and those interested solely in the
legal and constitutional aspects of the issue will find little new
or innovative. Strossen defends pornography on feminist and
other grounds as well. Compared to the harsh and often humor-
less diatribes of the antipornography feminists, it is a welcome
addition to the debate.
1. There is a difference between obscenity and pornography, although in both lay
and legal use the differences are often blurred or ignored. Among the definitions of
'obscene" are "disgusting to the senses," "abhorrent to morality or virtue, specif. de-
signed to incite lust or depravity," and "containing or being language regarded as
taboo in polite society." Pornography is defined as "a depiction of erotic behavior (as
in writing or painting) designed to cause sexual excitement." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1767 (3d ed. 1986). As such,
what is obscene may not necessarily be pornographic, and what is pornographic, by
this definition, certainly need not be obscene.
2. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and its companion case, Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Court held that sexually-oriented
expression came within constitutional protection only if it met certain first Amend-
ment standards. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. One standard requires that the sexually-ori-
ented expression possess "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id.
3. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT (1940). Emerson has responded to the Dworkin-MacKinnon proposal in Pornog-
raphy and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 130 (1985).
4. NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE
FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).
5. For a more legally-oriented analysis, see Nadine Strossen, The Convergence of
Feminist and Civil Liberties Principles in the Pornography Debate, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
201 (1987), and Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "the" Feminist Critique of
Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1993).
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II. THE DWORKIN-MACKINNON STATUTE
In the 1970s, as part of a broad feminist critique of sexist,
violent imagery in contemporary society, women began focusing
on pornography and how to deal with it. Nearly all feminists
could agree that depictions of violence and brutality, especially
linked to portraits of sexual domination and humiliation, de-
graded women. In 1979, they formed Women Against Pornogra-
phy to advocate education about pornography and to protest it. 6
The group, however, specifically eschewed censorship, and de-
clared that it was not seeking to carve out "any new exceptions
to the First Amendment."7
Eventually, a group of antipornography feminists began to
focus almost entirely on sexual materials. According to Carole
Vance, "[siexism in sex, or in its substitute, sexually explicit
material, was apparently worse than sexism anywhere else.
According to its critics, pornography was now the central engine
of women's oppression, the major socializer of men, the chief
agent of violence against women."8
In 1983, Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, both
faculty members at the University of Minnesota, drafted a mod-
el antipornography law that the Minneapolis City Council
passed.' The uniqueness of the law lies in the treatment of
pornography as a civil rights violation rather than as speech
outside the protection of the First Amendment as described by
the Miller criteria'0 for defining legal obscenity."
6. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 73.
7. Id. at 73.
8. Id. at 74 (quoting Carole Vance in Ideas-Feminism and Censorship at 14
(transcript from Canadian Broadcasting Co. (Toronto: CBC Radio Works, 1993))).
Vance, a Columbia University professor, was a founding member of the Feminist
Anti-Censorship Taskforce (FACT). Id. at 73.
9. Id. at 75 (citing ANDREA DWORMKN & CATHARINE MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY
AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 132-42 (1988)).
10. See supra note 2.
11. For a defense of the proposed Minneapolis ordinance, and by implication all
succeeding ones as well, see Michael A. Gershel, Evaluating a Proposed Civil Rights
Approach to Pornography: Legal Analysis as if Women Mattered, 11 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 41 (1985).
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The ordinance declared that pornography is "'a practice of sex
discrimination,"'12 and provided causes of action "for damages
and injunctive relief for four offenses: 'trafficking in pornogra-
phy,' 'coercion into pornography,' 'forcing pornography on a
person,' and 'assault or physical attack due to pornography.'""3
Essential to the entire scheme is the definition of pornography
as "graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through
pictures and/or words."'4 The ordinance then went on to give
eight criteria of what constituted "subordination":
a. women . . . presented as dehumanized sexual objects,
things or commodities; or
b. women . . . presented as sexual objects who enjoy hu-
miliation or pain; or
c. women . . . presented as sexual objects experiencing
sexual pleasure in rape, incest, or other sexual assault; or
d. women . . . presented as sexual objects tied up or cut
up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
e. women ... presented in postures or positions of sexual
submission, servility, or display; or
f. women's body parts-including but not limited to vagi-
nas, breasts and buttocks- .. exhibited such that women
are reduced to those parts; or
g. women . . . presented being penetrated by objects or
animals; or
h. women ... presented in scenarios of degradation, hu-
miliation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior,
bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these
conditions sexual. 5
Although the City Council passed this proposal twice, the
Democratic mayor of the city, Donald Fraser, who had been a
consistent champion of women's rights, vetoed it both times on
the grounds that it violated the First Amendment.'6 Over the
12. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 75.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 75 (citing ANDREA DWORKIN AND CATHARINE MAcKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY
AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 138-42 (1988)). For a detailed
discussion of the ordinance, see Paul Brest and Ann Vandenburg, Politics, Feminism,
and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 607 (1987).
16. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 77.
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next few years a number of cities throughout the country con-
sidered the Dworkin-MacKinnon statute. In 1984, a coalition of
conservative Republicans and right-wing groups that had invari-
ably opposed women's rights managed to secure the statute's
passage in Indianapolis. 7 Although touted as a pro-woman
law, the local chapter of the National Organization for Women
opposed its passage, while the antifeminist Phyllis Schlafly, the
Reverend -Greg Dixon of the Moral Majority, and Beulah
Coughenour, who had led the Stop ERA movement, all support-
ed the statute.' 8
MacKinnon explained the rationale behind the law as follows:
To reach the magnitude of this problem on the scale it
exists, our law makes trafficking in pornogra-
phy-production, sale, exhibition, or distribu-
tion-actionable. Under the obscenity rubric, much legal
and psychological scholarship has centered on a search for
the elusive link between pornography defined as obscenity
and harm. They have looked high and low-in the mind of
the male consumer, in society or in its "moral fabric," in
correlations between variations in levels of anti-social acts
and liberalization of obscenity laws. The only harm they
have found has been they have attributed to "the social
interests in order and morality." Until recently, no one
looked very persistently for harm to women, particularly
harm to women through men.... The pornography doesn't
just drop out of the sky, go into his head and stop there.
Specifically, men rape, batter, prostitute, molest, and sex-
ually harass women. Under conditions of inequality, they
also hire, fire, promote, and grade women, decide how much
or whether or not we are worth paying and for what, define
and approve and disapprove of women in ways that count,
that determine our lives. 9
In pornography, there it is, in one place, all of the abuses
that women had to struggle so long even to begin to articu-
late, all the unspeakable abuse: the rape, the battery, the
sexual harassment, the prostitution, and the sexual abuse
17. Id.
18. Id. at 77-78.
19. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 50-52 (1985).
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of children. Only in pornography it is called something else:
sex, sex, sex, sex, and sex, respectively.
20
In less than ninety minutes after Mayor William Hudnut
signed the Indianapolis ordinance into law, a coalition of book-
sellers and publishers challenged the statute in federal court on
First Amendment grounds."
III. THE COURTS AND ANTIPORNOGRAPHY STATUTES
The Dworkin-MacKinnon statute did not fare well in the
courts. At the trial level, Judge Sara Evans Barker found the
ordinance a gross violation of the First Amendment, and de-
nounced efforts to alter social behavior by restricting speech.
"To deny free speech in order to engineer social change in the
name of accomplishing a greater good for one sector of our
society erodes the freedom of all and ... threatens tyranny and
injustice for those subjected to the rule of such laws.""
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit agreed. Judge Frank Easterbrook, who had been a
law professor at the University of Chicago before President
Reagan named him to the bench, delivered the opinion for the
court in words that fully endorsed traditional First Amendment
defenses of deviant thought:
The ordinance discriminates on the ground of the content of
the speech. Speech treating women in the approved way-in
sexual encounters "premised on equality"-is lawful no
matter how sexually explicit. Speech treating women in the
disapproved way-as submissive in matters sexual or as
enjoying humiliation-is unlawful no matter how significant
the literary, artistic, or political qualities of the work taken
as a whole. The state may not ordain preferred viewpoints
in this way. The Constitution forbids the state to declare
one perspective right and silence opponents.'
20. Id. at 16-17.
21. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 79.
22. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind.
1984).
23. Id. at 1337.
24. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985) (ci-
406 [Vol. 29:401
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Any rationale we could imagine in support of this ordinance
could not be limited to sex discrimination. Free speech has
been on balance an ally of those seeking change. Govern-
ments that want stasis start by restricting speech. Culture
is a powerful force of continuity; Indianapolis paints pornog-
raphy as part of the culture of power. Change in any com-
plex system ultimately depends on the ability of outsiders
to challenge accepted views and the reigning institutions.
Without a strong guarantee of freedom of speech, there is
no effective right to challenge what is.
To the antipornography feminists, the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion made no sense because it rested on all the wrong grounds.
MacKinnon made clear that to her, the First Amendment is not
the controlling constitutional provision in this debate. In fact,
First Amendment jurisprudence makes little sense when deal-
ing with the issues that concern her. MacKinnon charges "[tihe
law of the First Amendment comprehends that freedom of ex-
pression, in the abstract, is a system but fails to comprehend
that sexism (and racism), in the concrete, are also systems."26
As for the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller, she asked
the question "if a woman is subjected, why should it matter
that the work has other value?"
27
MacKinnon denounced the Hudnut decision as "'the Dred
Scott of the women's movement,'2 8 a somewhat overblown
statement that corfused the single issue of pornography with
the much broader range of social, political and economic prob-
lems that informs the women's movement. Following the Su-
preme Court's affirmance of the Seventh Circuit decision, a
federal court invalidated another Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance
that had been enacted in Bellingham, Washington.29
tations omitted), afl'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
25. Id. at 332.
26. CATHARINE MAcKiNNON, TOWARD A FEMIusT THEORY OF THE STATE 206
(1989).
27. MacKinnon, supra note 19, at 21.
28. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 80 (quoting Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Politics
of the First Amendment, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 213 (1987)).
29. Village Books v. City of Belingham, C88-1470D (W.D. Wash. 1988).
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The decision in Hudnut, as noted, followed traditional lines of
First Amendment analysis. One reason proponents of the India-
napolis law objected is that their legal rational does not rely on
the First Amendment, but rather on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. All feminists agree that
"[t]he Women's Movement is a civil rights movement.""0
Dworkin and MacKinnon therefore attempted to frame a consti-
tutional rationale based on civil rights assumptions; pornogra-
phy, like racial discrimination, affects all members of the group
in a harmful manner, and thus may be prohibited. Rather than
viewing pornography as speech, they see it as practice, and even
under traditional First Amendment analysis, action is treated
differently than expression.
According to the Dworkin-MacKinnon rationale, most women
in pornographic films are poor, minimally educated, and a dis-
proportionate number are women of color. A high percentage
are incest survivors, and many enter pornography in despera-
tion, as runaways with little or no choice. Others are forced to
"act" by husbands, lovers or pimps. The result is a business
built upon the systematic coercion and exploitation of women.
Moreover, the products churned out by this system cause ha-
rassment of women in the workplace and elsewhere, and lead
to further brutalization and degradation. 1 If one substituted
the word "blacks" for "women," there would be no question that
such a system would be found constitutionally impermissible.
Why then, the argument goes, should pornography be allowed
to flourish when it violates the civil rights of women?
One of the weak points of the Strossen book is that it does
not tackle this issue head on. After listening to both sides in
this feminist battle, one occasionally feels that they talk past
each other, rather than directly to each other's arguments. 2
30. Wendy Kaminer, Pornography and the First Amendment: Prior Restraints and
Private Action, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 239, 247 (Laura
Lederer ed., 1980).
31. Gershel, supra note 11, at 53-61.
32. MacKinnon has declared that in the pornography debate "[the law of equality
and the law of freedom of speech are on a collision course in this country."
STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 30 (quoting CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71
(1993)). As far as MacKinnon is concerned the values of free expression are secondary
to freeing women-all women-from the harm caused by pornography.
408 [Vol. 29:401
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However, Strossen's strength is that she takes the battle to her
opponents. Since she is writing for a popular rather than an
academic audience, her concern is to show that many of the
sweeping assumptions about pornography made by the
"MacDworkinites," as she calls them, are not true; the practical
results of the feminist antipornography crusade have tended to
stifle artistic speech more than hard core pornographic enter-
prises and should First Amendment principles be sacrificed, it
will be women, artists, and minorities who will suffer the most.
IV. THE "SEX PANIC"
According to Strossen, "we are in the midst of a full-fledged
'sex panic,' in which seemingly all descriptions and depictions of
human sexuality are becoming embattled.""3 We are all famil-
iar with Senator Jesse Helms' attacks on the National Endow-
ment for the Arts, but as Strossen shows "erotophobia" can be
found all over the country; even images of nude bodies in non-
sexual settings are under attack. 4
For example, in 1993, Vermont officials hung bedsheets over
a mural in a state office building conference room. The mural,
by artist Sam Kerson, had been commissioned to mark the
500th anniversary of Columbus landing in the New World. 5
Although one local newspaper described the mural as "a politi-
cally correct rendition of Columbus and his men . . . battle-axes
and crucifix raised, ready to oppress the natives,"36 a number
of female employees objected to the depiction, complaining that
because the mural included bare-breasted native women, its
placement in the conference room constituted "sexual harass-
ment." '
In addition, when the writer Ntozake Shange appeared on
the cover of Poets & Writers, she wore, as she described it, "a
pretty lace top."" The magazine's readers, however, objected to
33. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 20.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 21-22.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 23 (quoting Nitozake Shange, Where Do We Stand on Pornography?
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the display. In the next two issues, the magazine received com-
plaints asking if Poets & Writers had become a flesh magazine,
and why had Shange appeared in her underwear?39 Shange,
who reported the incident in a Ms. symposium, questioned the
validity of these complaints. She wondered if "bare shoulders
are exploitation now?"4" Andrea Dworkin responded affirma-
tively stating that "[ilt's very hard to look at a picture of a
woman's body and not see it with the perception that her body
is being exploited."41
The case of the highly respected Professor Graydon Snyder of
the Chicago Theological Seminary illustrates the filing of a
frivolous sexual harassment complaint. Snyder, an ordained
minister, had for thirty years used a lesson from the Talmud as
a starting point in his discussion of differences between Jewish
and Christian concepts of sin, guilt, and responsibility. In the
Talmud, the lesson deals with the responsibility of a man who
falls off a roof, lands on a woman, and in doing so, accidentally
has intercourse with her. The Talmudic lesson is that the man
is innocent because the act was unintentional.42
In 1994, a female student filed a sexual harassment charge
against Snyder. The Seminary issued a formal reprimand, put
notices in every student and faculty mailbox announcing that
Snyder had engaged in sexual harassment, and then assigned a
school official to monitor his classes lest he engage in further
"harassment."4"
Are these isolated examples? The answer, unfortunately, is
not. Strossen is not merely picking out sensational incidents to
argue that the ideas put forward by Dworkin and MacKinnon
are triggering a wave of anti-erotic persecution and making it
impossible for male instructors to use any gender-based incident
in teaching. Her book is full of examples and the total effect is
depressing. There are indeed all too many examples of sexual
harassment in the academy and in the workplace, and men








need to think more carefully about what they say and do.
Strossen knows quite well that there are many real cases of
harassment and exploitation, but in discussing them she points
out that there are criminal and civil laws already on the books
to deal with such behavior.4 And, as we shall see, she takes a
far different view of the "sex business" than do the antipornog-
raphy feminists. If nothing else, Strossen's perspective is a
voice pleading for sanity, for common sense, and indeed for
civility.45 Beyond that, she is sounding an alarm; if we aban-
don our commitment to free expression, the results will be
disastrous.
V. THE ORDINANCE IN PRACTICE
The original Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance targeted
pornographers and those who merchandised their products. The
American Civil Liberties Union feared from the start that, in
practice, the police and prosecutors would use the law against
gay and lesbian bookstores, and against women themselves.46
Although the ordinance has never been implemented in the
United States, Canada adopted a similar law in 1992.'7 Ac-
cording to Strossen, it "has turned anticensorship feminists'
fears into realities."48
Canada, it should be noted, is not a totalitarian country. In
fact, with some exceptions, it is as open and democratic a soci-
44. Id. at 119-32.
45. The attacks on anticensorship feminists in general, and on Strossen in partic-
ular, have been far from civil. "MacKinnon has compared feminists who oppose cen-
sorship to 'house niggers who sided with the masters,' and MacKinnon has de-
nounced FACT (the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce) by stating, "[tihe labor move-
ment had its scabs, the slavery movement had its Uncle Toms and Oreo cookies, and
we have FACT." Id. at 32 (citing Pete Hamill, Women on the Verge of a Legal Break-
down, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1993, at 186). Dworkin has condemned free-speech feminists as
"politically self-righteous fellow travelers of the pornographers." Id. at 32 (quoting
Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: The New Terrorism, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
218 (1978-79)). Commenting about Strossen, Norma Ramos, the general counsel of
Women Against Pornography, said that the ACLU "uses its women to further its
antifeminist agenda. When Strossen became an apologist for the pornographers, she
passed their litmus test to become president." Id. at 33.
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ety as our own. One would expect to find censorship in regimes
such as Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany or Maoist China; as a
number of writers have commented, tyrannical regimes have
always attempted to restrict sexual expression. In practice, it
has been a short step from repressing unpopular sexual ideas
to repressing unpopular ideas of any sort, especially those that
challenge the social or political status quo. As writer Erica Jong
noted, "I believe that censorship only springs back against the
givers of culture-against authors, artists, and feminists,
against anybody who wants to change society. Should censor-
ship be imposed ... feminists would be the first to suffer."49
This is exactly what happened in Canada, although the
adopted statute is not as sweeping as the statute struck down
in Hudnut. The law provides that no material will be deemed
obscene if it has an artistic purpose or is part of a serious
treatment of a sexual theme.5" It only applies to the work tak-
en as a whole, not to isolated portions.51 The Indianapolis ordi-
nance, on the other hand, cared little about art, and held that
any segment depicting subordination of women would damn the
entire work. The Canadian law does, however, adopt the
Dworkin-MacKinnon view of pornography as material portray-
ing women in a "subordinating" or "degrading" manner, and its
enforcement has been marked by homophobic and antifeminist
excesses.
52
Much to the delight of Dworkin and MacKinnon, the Canadi-
an Supreme Court upheld the law in Butler v. Regina.53
MacKinnon praised the decision as "a stunning victory for wom-
en. This is of world historic importance. This makes Canada
the first place in the world that says what is obscene is what
harms women, not what offends our values."54 Within a year
after the decision, reporter Carl Wilson declared what he
termed to be an "epidemic of censorship."55 As civil libertarians
49. Id. at 225 (citing Mary Kay Blakely, "Is One Woman's Sexuality Another
Woman's Pornography?" MS., April 1985, at 37-38 (quoting Erica Jong, writer)).
50. Id at 231.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 1992 S.C.R. 452 (Can).
54. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 229 (citing Tamar Lewin, Canada Court Says
Porn Harms Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at B7).
55. Id. at 230 (quoting Carl Wilson, Northern Closure: Anti-Pornography Cam-
412 [Vol. 29:401
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and feminists had feared, the authority of the state did not
restrict X-rated porn shops, but dissident gay, lesbian and femi-
nist booksellers.
Even antipornography feminists who had supported the law
now had second thoughts. Karen Busby, a lawyer with the
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, a group MacKinnon
co-founded, and who had worked on its brief in Butler, con-
fessed that the results had not been what they had intended:
Before the ink was dry on Butler ... the Toronto police
raided Glad Day Bookshop, a lesbian and gay bookstore,
and confiscated Bad Attitude, a lesbian erotic magazine....
It was a shocking raid. Police ignored representations made
by men of women in most cities across Canada... and yet
the one thing that they raid is this one magazine that sells
about forty copies every two months in Canada when it
comes out. It's hardly a threat to women's equality and yet
that's the magazine that they chose.56
Two Canadian lower court decisions following Butler have
also been marked by homophobic decisions in which the judges
have declared homosexual sex as degrading and dehumaniz-
ing.57 In addition Project P, the antiobscenity squad of the On-
tario Provincial Police, has announced that by its interpretation
of Butler, sexual expression is permitted only if it includes
romance and a story line!" While Canadian customs officers
have seized every variety of homosexual material, 9 they failed
to keep items published by major book houses from coming into
Canada. Thus, Madonna's Sex, and Bret Easton Ellis' American
Psycho, which contains violent and sexually graphic accounts of
the mutilation of women, were not- even questioned."
paign in Canada, THE NATION, Dec. 27, 1993, at 788).
56. Id. at 232 (citing Karen Busby, "LEAF and Pornography: Litigating on
Equality and Sexual Representation," 17 (1993) (unpublished remarks at Toronto
Symposium)).
57. Id. at 233 (citing The Queen or: v. Scythes (Ontario Pizov. Div., Feb. 16,
1993); Glad Day Bookshop v. Deputy Minister, No. 619/90, 1992 Ont. C. J. LEXIS
1296 (Ontario Gen. Div., July 14, 1992)).
58. Id. at 234-35.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 235. A group of MacDworkinites ripped a copy of Sex to shreds at a
well-publicized University of Chicago Law School conference in 1992.
1995] 413
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Strossen takes more than a mild schadenfretide in the fact
that two of the books seized by Canadian customs were written
by Andrea Dworkin herself.6 The Canadian customs declared
the books "illegally eroticized pain and bondage." 2 Another
item seized was a book entitled Hot, Hotter, Hottest, apparently
because customs officials equated heat with sex.63 Had they
opened the cover they would have discovered a cookbook for
spicy food.' Other examples of materials seized are not so
humorous. A retired psychologist had written a book about his
work with child molesters in order to get public action on the
subject.65 He sent the manuscript to an American literary
agent, and when she returned it to him, Canadian customs
officers seized it; three Mounties later raided his house, arrest-
ed him, and took him to jail in a squad car.66
In the fall of 1993, Catherine MacKinnon, who had hailed
the law and the Butler decision, conceded that the Canadian
government was not going after violent material that degraded
women, and that the law had done little, if anything, to ad-
vance women's causes in Canada.6
VI. SEXUAL EXPRESSION AS PROTECTED EXPRESSION
The Canadian experience should give pause to those who
think that outlawing pornography benefits women. The message
61. Id. at 237 (quoting Sarah Scott, Porn Police: Who Decides What to Ban at the
Border, MONTREAL GAZETIE, Apr. 14, 1993 at Al). The seized books were ANDREA
DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING (1984) and ANDREA DWORKN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POS-
SESSING WOMEN (1979).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 238.
64. Id. Ohio officials had earlier confiscated a video entitled Doing It Debbie's
Way, because of its allegedly provocative title. Id. Perhaps the officers had in mind
the porn classic Debbie Does Dallas, but at the very least they should have looked at
what they had seized-an exercise video by that most wholesome of actresses, Debbie
Reynolds. Id. at 97.
65. Id. at 237.
66. Id. at 238 (quoting Mary Williams Walsh, Chill Hits Canada's Pornography
Laws, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993 at Al). Works by such respected writers as Margue-
rite Duras, Langston Hughes, Anne Rice, and Oscar Wilde, to name a few, have also
been seized because they contained episodes depicting sexual activity that offended
the censors. Id. at 238-39.
67. Id. at 239.
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of Strossen's book is that most restrictions of free expression
not only harm women, but also seriously affect the larger soci-
ety. A case for regulation could be made, even under John Stu-
art Mill's belief that only harm to others can justify any form of
state regulation, if there were real evidence that pornography
leads to violence against women. MacKinnon herself, however,
has in effect conceded that there is no such body of evidence.68
At the same time, she attempted to justify censorship of sexual-
ly oriented materials by declaring "[tihere is no evidence that
pornography does no harm."69 For example, looking at Scan-
dinavian countries where pornography is freely available and
unrestricted, one does not find widespread violence against
women.70 In addition, two American commissions addressing
the issue came to starkly differing conclusions, which cannot be
rationalized by improvements in scientific investigation.7'
MacKinnon and Dworkin have railed against what they con-
sider the paternalistic, anti-woman American society, and yet
they want to put power over expression into the hands of that
society's government!72
68. Id.
69. CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, at 37 (1993).
70. See STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 255-56.
71. The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, which was established in
1967 by Lyndon Johnson, issued its Report in 1970. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY &
PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). A majority of this Commission found no empirical evi-
dence to support the contention that pornography caused sex crimes or other criminal
behavior, and concluded that established patterns of sexual behavior were not
changed by exposure to sexually explicit materials. The Report was attacked for its
alleged methodological inadequacies by feminists who would later be in both the anti-
pornography and anticensorship camps. In 1985 President Ronald Reagan created the
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography headed by Edwin Meese, with a clear
mandate to overturn the findings of the earlier report. The Meese Commission was
heavily stacked with law enforcement officials and members of religious groups.
Therefore, its conclusion that pornography was a cause for many of society's ills came
as no surprise. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, 131 CONG.
REC. S6700-03 (1985). For a more detailed analysis of the two reports, see RONALD J.
BERGER, ET AL., FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 22-28 (1991).
72. According to MacKinnon, "male dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and
tenacious system of power in history. . . [and] is metaphysically nearly perfect."
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 182
(Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy, eds., 1991).
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There are many debatable parts of Nadine Strossen's book.
This can be a sign of strength as well as a sign of weakness.
Reading a provocative book, one that questions certain basic
assumptions, is always more interesting than reading some-
thing which merely confirms beliefs. However, her grouping of
all forms of sexually-oriented material into one category can be
misleading. There is a difference between erotic materials and
those which portray the violent debasement of women; as Jus-
tice Potter Stewart said, "I know it when I see it. .. ."" By
glossing over these differences, Strossen avoids coming to terms
with one of the more powerful arguments of the antipornogra-
phy feminists: in making these films, women are debased, and
the resulting humiliation may find an echo in wider society."4
Strossen also deals with something that Dworkin and
MacKinnon ignore: the nature of women's sexuality. Dworkin
and MacKinnon have portrayed sexual relations between men
and women in terms that deny any form of enjoyment. Dworkin
has said:
Intercourse with men as we know them is increasingly
impossible. It requires an aborting of creativity and
strength, a refusal of responsibility and freedom: a bitter
personal death. It means remaining the victim, forever
annihilating all self-respect. It means acting out the female
role, incorporating the masochism, self-hatred, and passivity
which are central to it."5
Catherine MacKinnon wrote: "Compare victims' reports of
rape with women's reports of sex. They look a lot alike....
[Tihe major distinction between intercourse (normal) and rape
73. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Potter J., concurring).
74. Strossen does not ignore the fact that some women are indeed forced into
performing acts which are repulsive to them and to others, but she does make the
case that there are women in the "sex business" who are there of their own free
choice, who enjoy what they are doing, and it is for them, and not for others, to
determine how they lead their lives. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 185. She also propos-
es ways to reduce violence against women without subverting the First Amendment.
Id. at 273.
75. Id. at 108 (citing ANDREA DWoRKIN, WOMAN HATING 184 (1984)). In her book,
LETTERS FROM A WAR ZONE, Dworkin declared that marriage is nothing more than a
legal license to rape." Id. at 110 (citing ANDREA DWORKIN, LETTERS FROM A WAR
ZONE 119, 176 (1988)).
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(abnormal) is that the normal happens so often that one cannot
get anyone to see anything wrong with it."
76
Given these comments, Strossen is not wrong to charge the
feminist, antipornography movement with believing that "sex is
inherently degrading to women."" Moreover, it raises "a seri-
ous dilemma for those who deplore sexism but not sex."7 8 One
antipornography group offered a solution by forming
WAS-Women Against Sex.7 ' As Professor Jeanne Schroeder of
the Cardozo Law School has noted, these views harken back
not only to the Puritanism of the seventeenth century and nine-
teenth century Victorian ideas, but also to the anti-sensual
denunciations of St. Augustine and other early Christian fa-
thers."
Strossen is openly and unabashedly sexual, and as the subti-
tle of one of her chapters notes, "Sexuality Does Not Equal
Sexism."8 ' Strossen makes clear what MacKinnon and others
ignore-women do enjoy sex; they can and do participate will-
ingly and as equals in sexual relationships; and they enjoy and
use sexual materials such as books and films.82 In a marvelous
chapter entitled "Different Strokes for Different Folks: The
Wonderful Diversity of Pornographic Imagination," Strossen re-
counts stories of feminist women who enjoy sex and who enjoy
pornography.83 Writer Sallie Tisdale has said "[wiomen who
have seen little pornography seem to assume that the images in
most films are primarily, obsessively, ones of rape. I find the
opposite theme in American films: that of an adolescent rut,
both male and female. Its obsession is virility, endurance,
lust.""
76. Id. at 108 (citing Catharine Mac~innon as quoted in Christina H. Sommers,
Hard-Line Feminists Guilty of Ms.-Representation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1991, at A14).
77. Id. at 107.
78. Id. at 112.
79. Id.
80. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes
in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1980).
81. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 119.
82. Although the actual number of X-rated films rented by women at video stores
may never be known, it is quite high. Conservative estimates are that women, either
singly or as part of a couple, account for about 40% of the adult video rental market.
Id. at 144.
83. Id. at 141-60.
84. Id. at 143 (quoting Sallie Tisdale, Talk Dirty to Me: A Woman's Taste for
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Even the bate noire of the antipornography group, rape, may
be something other than subjugation of women. A woman's
nightmare in real life, may be, in the same woman's fantasy,
an enjoyable daydream."' Strossen cites, among others, Anais
Nin's diary in which the writer described her rare fantasies as
"[a] desire to feel the brutality of man. ... To be violated is
perhaps a need in women, a secret erotic need."86 The central
theme of Lina Wertmuller's acclaimed 1975 film, Swept Away,
was the classic rape myth.17 Although the film was by a wom-
an who saw the rape not as simple brutalization, but also as
part of a woman's fantasy, it was scorned by the antipornogra-
phy feminists."
Strossen is asking that both women and men not be stereo-
typed, and then controlled by the State on the basis of that
characterization. 9 There are problems and there is violence;
but there are many materials in the market that are crudely
labeled as pornography. In a free society, no one, especially the
State, should decide for all what is acceptable sexual behavior.
VII. CONCLUSION
The heart of the Strossen book relies on a liberal rendition of
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence which bans content
discrimination and considers all ideas to have some value."
Perhaps in an age of sound bytes, terrorism, and hi-tech weap-
onry, the old notion of a market place of ideas needs to be
rethought. That is a task for another book. Her concern here is
with sexually-related materials, all of which would come under
the rubric of "pornography" if the followers of Dworkin and
MacKinnon have their way.91
Pornography, HARPER'S, Feb. 1992, at 45).
85. Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 152-53.
89. See id. at 245-46.
90. Id. at 41.
91. Id. at 19.
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There is no question that ours is a male-dominated society.
Despite the many gains made both socially and legally by
women in the last twenty years, much discrimination remains.
There is also no question about the violence perpetrated against
women, often by their spouses or boyfriends; this is a serious
issue deserving a societal commitment to its solution. However,
to blame all problems that women confront on pornography,
and to assume that the abolishment of pornography, no matter
how defined, will allow women to enter a new era is mere
speculation.92
The advocates of the Dworkin-MacKinnon measure have
provided society with a service by illustrating the problem, and
forcing people to recognize that violence is a constant fear for
many women. However, the shrillness of their argument does
not help the cause. I wondered whether Strossen was quoting
out of context, since some of the comments in her book, includ-
ing those contained above, seemed so fanatical and so far re-
moved from reality. But if anyone doubts the stridency, all they
need do is spend five minutes browsing through Andrea
Dworkin's Letters from a War Zone,93 Catharine MacKinnon's
Only Words,94 or any of the other works cited in Defending
Pornography. One can then begin to appreciate why Rush
Limbaugh's epitaph of "feminazis" struck so close to home.
Aside from her devotion to principles of free speech, Strossen
is also committed to free individual choice.95 She is quite open
about her own enjoyment of sexual films, and makes a strong
case of how and why other women enjoy seeing them, and in
some cases, acting in them.9" She makes it quite clear that it
is an individual choice, and that no one has the right to tell
someone else what to read or see, especially in the privacy of
one's home or hotel room. 7 If particular types of film offend a
92. Id. at 245. Even if we focus just on materials that include sexual violence,
according to Strossen, surveys indicate that depictions of violent sexual encounters,
which the Dworkin/MacKinnon group equate as all of pornography, actually account
for only 3% to 8% of the material on the market. Id. at 143.
93. ANDREA DWORKIN, LETrERs FROM A WAR ZONE (1988).
94. MACKINNON, supra note 70.
95. E.g., STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 70-71.
96. Id. at 191-95; Sarah Kershaw, Against Pornophobia, NEW YORK, Jan. 16,
1995, at 20-21.
97. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Claudia Dreifus, Nadine
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person, she is not obligated to watch;98 however, as Justice
Harlan noted, "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."99 This is
a far cry from MacKinnon's blanket condemnation:
The liberal defense of pornography as human sexual libera-
tion, as de-repression-whether by feminists, lawyers, or
neo-Freudians-is a defense not only of force and sexual
terrorism, but of the subordination of women. Sexual libera-
tion in the liberal sense frees male sexual aggression in the
feminist sense. What in the liberal view looks like love and
romance looks a lot like hatred and torture to the feminist.
Pleasure and eroticism become violation. Desire appears as
lust for dominance and submission."°
It is always difficult to respond reasonably to fanatics, be-
cause, like all true believers, they are not concerned with rea-
son. They "know" what is right, and whether the facts fit their
preconceived notions is irrelevant. Andrea Dworkin, Catharine
MacKinnon, and their allies have not only a vision but a cause.
As far as they are concerned, questions of free speech are sec-
ondary and irrelevant in their mission to wipe out pornography.
In this context Nadine Strossen has written a tough-minded
but sensible book. It has its faults, but on the whole it illus-
trates its points clearly, effectively, and convincingly. If the
antipornography lobby has its way, women and other minorities
will suffer along with society as a whole. Against that possibili-
ty, the only bulwark is a firm commitment to the principles of
the First Amendment. It is not a new argument, but it is one
that, in these days, cannot be repeated too often.
Strossen: 'I find the pro-censorship feminists politically naive', THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar.
1994, at 36.
98. STROSSEN, supra note 4, at 69-72.
99. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
100. Catharine MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 327
(1984).
420 [Vol. 29:401
